Gaza City/Jerusalem/Ramallah/Brussels, 23 October 2014
1. Overview
More than seven weeks after the most devastating war yet waged in Gaza, its underlying causes remain unresolved. Hamas did not achieve an end to Gaza’s closure; Israel did not attain the demilitarisation of the Strip or Hamas. The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) remains unrepresentative and its credibility continues to fade. Fatah’s popularity has sunk while Hamas’s has increased to levels unseen since its 2006 electoral victory. Small steps toward reconciliation between Hamas and the PLO have been taken, but they are very distant from the end goal of a unified, representative Palestinian leadership. But in reconciliation lies the only hope of achieving a sustainable ceasefire and, more broadly, of bringing Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank under one authority.
Israel, much of the PLO and the international community fear the possible consequences of integrating Hamas into the Palestinian national movement, as is called for in the Hamas-PLO reconciliation agreement signed on 23 April 2014. At the same time, many recognise that thwarting even the partial implementation of that agreement pushed a desperate Hamas toward war. So they, together with Hamas, have settled for the time being on a temporary fix, which is forestall robust PLO reform while permitting some significant but limited steps toward Palestinian reconciliation, including allowing the new Palestinian Authority (PA) government, formed on 2 June 2014, to regain formal control of Gaza, patrol its borders, staff its crossings, and pay salaries to employees previously paid by Hamas, all while leaving Hamas’s military wing as the strongest power within Gaza and the true guarantor of security there.
This arrangement, should it crystallise, would allow all parties to pursue their short-term interests. Hamas would be able to rebuild its military capabilities (albeit faced with greater obstacles than in the past), and Gaza’s population would receive aid and reconstruction. The Palestinian Authority would have the opportunity to gain a toe-hold in Gaza. The PLO, though concerned that it will be helping to strengthen Hamas and reward its violence, will secure increased Western support and be able to more credibly claim that it represents all Palestinians. And Israel would enjoy quiet for a period of unknown but longer duration than in the past, as it and Hamas prepare for the next battle.
With Gaza and Israel having fought their third war in six years, a more lasting respite would be welcome. Of course avoiding another eventual war requires a longer-term strategy that helps establish a Palestinian state. But with two-state negotiations in hiatus, the best the parties can hope for today is a more stable, durable ceasefire. This will depend not only on ensuring that the reconciliation agreement is implemented, but also on a significant change in Israeli policy toward Gaza. There are nascent indications of a belated realisation among policymakers that constricting the territory has compromised Israel’s security and helped bring about the war. The extent of these indications will be crystallised in indirect ceasefire talks between Israel and Hamas, scheduled for late October. Another set of upcoming negotiations, between Hamas and the PLO, will be no less important, as Gaza cannot hope for real change if the PA’s technocratic government of national consensus does not take up its responsibilities – at least regarding Gaza’s borders and the payment of its government employees.